Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts

Petra Geraats ()

Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Recently, several central banks have abandoned the usual secrecy in monetary policy and become very transparent. This paper provides an explanation for this puzzling fact, focusing on the disclosure of central bank forecasts. It shows that transparency reduces the inflationary bias and gives the central bank greater flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. Furthermore, it makes it easier for a central bank to build reputation. To achieve these benefits of transparency it is generally necessary to publish the conditional central bank forecasts for both inflation and output.

JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2001-02-09
Note: 34 pages, Acrobat .pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mac/papers/0012/0012011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2001)
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2000)
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0012011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).