Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts

Petra Geraats ()

No 2582, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Recently, several central banks have abandoned the usual secrecy in monetary policy and become very transparent. This paper provides an explanation for this puzzling fact, focusing on the disclosure of central bank forecasts. It shows that transparency reduces the inflationary bias and gives the central bank greater flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. Furthermore, it makes it easier for a central bank to build a reputation. To achieve these benefits of transparency it is generally necessary to publish the conditional central bank forecasts for both inflation and output.

Keywords: transparency; Monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2001)
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2001)
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2000)
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