Affirmative Action in Hierarchies

Suzanne Scotchmer

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: There is considerable evidence that males are more prone to take risks than females. This difference has implications for rates of promotion in hierarchies where promotion is based on random signals of ability. I explore the promotion consequences of three types of performance standards: gender-blind standards, standards designed to promote agents of equal ability on average, and standards designed to promote equal numbers of both genders. These three objectives lead to different promotion standards, which highlights among other things that the goal of affirmative action is not well defined. Lower promotion standards for females can be necessary to ensure either equal abilities or equal numbers in the promoted populations.

Keywords: labor markets; affirmative action; hierarchy; risk-taking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Affirmative Action in Hierarchies (2005)
Working Paper: Affirmative Action in Hierarchies (2003)
Working Paper: Affirmative Action in Hierarchies (2003)
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