Affirmative Action in Hierarchies

Suzanne Scotchmer

No 11213, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: If promotion in a hierarchy is based on a random signal of ability, rates of promotion will be affected by risk-taking. Further, the numbers and abilities of risk-takers and non-risk-takers will be different at each stage of the hierarchy, and the ratio will be changing. I show that, under mild conditions, more risk-takers than non-risk-takers will survive at early stages, but they will have lower ability. At later stages, this will be reversed: Fewer risk-takers than non-risk-takers survive, but they will have higher ability. I give several interpretations for how these theorems relate to affirmative action, in light of considerable evidence that males are more risk-taking than females.

JEL-codes: J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Note: LS LE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Affirmative Action in Hierarchies (2003)
Working Paper: Affirmative Action in Hierarchies (2003)
Working Paper: Affirmative Action in Hierarchies (2003)
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