Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games

Joseph Farrell ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: communication; signaling; refinement of equilibrium; language; cheap talk; game theory; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Business and Corporate Communications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986-09-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games (2010)
Journal Article: Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games (1993)
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