One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium

Eddie Dekel and Joseph Farrell ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: communication; renegotiation; repeated games; Stackelberg equilibrium; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-02-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium (1990)
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