Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets

Joseph Farrell () and Michael Katz ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: We explore the logic of predation and rules designed to prevent it in markets subject to network effects. Although, as many have informally argued, predatory behavior is plausibly more likely to succeed in such markets, we find that it is particularly hard to intervene in network markets in ways that improve welfare. We find that imposition of the leading proposals for rules against predatory pricing may lower or raise consumer welfare, depending on conditions that may be difficult to identify in practice.

Keywords: predation; predatory behavior; network effects; price floors; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-08-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets (2002)
Working Paper: Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets (2001)
Working Paper: Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets (2001)
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