Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain

Richard Belfield and David Marsden

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this finding in terms of the 'beneficial constraint' arising from stronger employment protection in France, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activities in France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; and government fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduces the cost of its operation.

Keywords: incentive systems; merit pay; profit-sharing; employer networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 J5 M5 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain (2010)
Working Paper: Institutions and the management of human resources: incentive pay systems in France and Great Britain (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0941

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