The political economy of trade and migration: evidence from the US Congress

Paola Conconi, Giovanni Facchini, Max Steinhardt () and Maurizio Zanardi

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: We systematically examine the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to goods and migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade and migration liberalization. Still, important differences exist: Democrats favor trade reforms less than Republicans, while the opposite is true for immigration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape support for immigration, but not for trade.

Keywords: trade reforms; immigration reforms; roll-call votes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-mig and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1564.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress (2020)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress (2020)
Working Paper: The political economy of trade and migration: evidence from the U.S. Congress (2018)
Working Paper: The political economy of trade and migration:Evidence from the U.S. Congress (2013)
Working Paper: The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress (2012)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress (2012)
Working Paper: The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress (2012)
Working Paper: The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the US Congress (2012)
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