Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration

Amihai Glazer, Vesa Kanniainen and Panu Poutvaara

No 1075, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogeneous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the rich to reduce rents earned by absentee landlords. When the rich are mobile, a tax on them induces little migration because the tax will reduce the rents on land inhabited by the rich. A race to the bottom need not appear.

Keywords: taxes; land rents; property values; migration; redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H70 R21 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-geo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Income taxes, property values, and migration (2008)
Working Paper: Income taxes, property values, and migration (2008)
Working Paper: Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1075

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