Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration

Amihai Glazer, Vesa Kanniainen and Panu Poutvaara

No 1889, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We consider taxation by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogeneous locations within a country. We show that a utilitarian government never equalizes after-tax incomes, even when it can impose group-specific lump-sum taxes. If migration is impossible, a utilitarian government may even transfer income from the poor to the rich, reducing the rents earned by absentee landlords. The redistributive tax on the rich may be higher or lower when the rich can migrate than when they cannot.

Keywords: migration; land rents; property values; taxes; redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H7 R21 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2008, 92 (3-4), 915-923

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp1889.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Income taxes, property values, and migration (2008)
Working Paper: Income taxes, property values, and migration (2008)
Working Paper: Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1889

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().