Efficient Economic Rent Taxation under a Global Minimum Corporate Tax

Shafik Hebous and Andualem Mengistu

No 11147, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The international agreement on a corporate minimum tax is a milestone in global corporate tax arrangements. The minimum tax disturbs the equivalence between otherwise equivalent forms of efficient economic rent taxation: cash-flow tax and allowance for corporate equity. The marginal effective tax rate initially declines as the statutory tax rate rises, reaching zero where the minimum tax is inapplicable, and increases thereafter. This kink occurs at a lower statutory rate under cash-flow taxation. We relax the assumption of full loss offset; provide a routine for computing effective rates under different designs; and discuss policy implications of the minimum tax.

Keywords: investment; minimum taxation; corporate tax reform; international taxation; rent tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H21 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-inv, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11147.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient Economic Rent Taxation under a Global Minimum Corporate Tax (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11147

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().