The Value of Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market

Michael Hoy and Mattias K Polborn

No 165, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. It is shown that individuals have an ncentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the existence of the test.

Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The value of genetic information in the life insurance market (2000)
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