The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?

Wolfgang Leininger and Axel Ockenfels

No 2187, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: none

Keywords: soccer; game theory; sports (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect? (2007)
Working Paper: The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2187

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