Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

Anne Sibert and Anne C. Sibert
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anne Sibert

No 226, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals ha ve more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.

Keywords: Reputation; collective decision making; central banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations (1999)
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