Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

Anne Sibert

No 2328, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy-making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.

Keywords: Central Banks; Collective Decision Making; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 E50 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2328 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2328

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=2328

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().