Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

Xenia Matschke and Anja Schöttner

No 2536, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper investigates the domestic government’s antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm’s cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms’ cost reports, accompanied by a threat of auditing and implementing penalty duties. We show that the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but may also help overcome the informational problems with regard to determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Keywords: antidumping duties; asymmetric information; trade protection; strategic trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Journal Article: Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information (2013)
Working Paper: Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2536

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