Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Massimo Bordignon () and Guido Tabellini

No 2600, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.

Keywords: run-off; municipal elections; political bargaining; property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2014)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2013)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2009)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2009)
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