Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Massimo Bordignon (), Tommaso Nannicini and Guido Tabellini

No 7561, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

Keywords: policy volatility; regression discontinuity design; electoral rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D72 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published - published in: American Economic Review, 2016, 106 (8), 2349-70

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Related works:
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2014)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2009)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2009)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2009)
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