The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Florian Englmaier, Andreas Roider and Uwe Sunde

No 3771, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the incentive system without changing the incentive system. The results indicate that salience of incentives itself is statistically and economically important for performance. We find that higher salience of incentives for quantity increases quantity, reduces quality, and increases in-pocket income of team managers.

Keywords: incentives; attention; salience; communication; field experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D80 J30 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3771

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