Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies

Lars Feld and Jan Schnellenbach

No 4382, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.

Keywords: redistribution; formal institutions; fiscal decentralization; presidential and parliamentary regimes; electoral systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 H11 H22 H50 I38 P50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies (2014)
Working Paper: Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: Evidence from developed economies (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4382

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