Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality

Werner Güth (), Hartmut Kliemt, Anastasios Koukoumelis, Maria Levati and Matteo Ploner

No 4541, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects’ costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.

Keywords: public project; bidding behavior; procedural fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D63 H44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and experimental functionality (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4541

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