Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence

Nadja Dwenger, Dorothea Kübler and Georg Weizsäcker

No 4740, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We investigate the possibility that a decision-maker prefers to avoid making a decision and instead delegates it to an external device, e.g., a coin flip. In a series of experiments the participants often choose lotteries between allocations, which contradicts most theories of choice such as expected utility but is consistent with a theory of responsibility aversion that implies a preference for randomness. A large data set on university applications in Germany shows a choice pattern that is also consistent with this theory and entails substantial allocative consequences.

Keywords: preference for randomization; menu-dependent preference; individual decision making; university choice; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Flipping a coin: Theory and evidence (2014)
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