The Commitment Role of Equity Financing

Matthias Fahn, Valeria Merlo and Georg Wamser

No 4841, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Existing theories of a firm’s optimal capital structure seem to fail in explaining why many healthy and profitable firms rely heavily on equity financing, even though benefits associated with debt (like tax shields) appear to be high and the bankruptcy risk low. This holds in particular for firms that show a strong commitment towards their workforce and are popular among employees. We demonstrate that such financing behavior may be driven by implicit arrangements made between a firm and its managers/employees. Equity financing generally strengthens a firm’s credibility to honor implicit promises. Debt, on the other hand, has an adverse effect on the enforceability of these arrangements because too much debt increases the firm’s reneging temptation, as some of the negative consequences of breaking implicit promises can be shifted to creditors. Our analysis provides an explanation for why some firms only use little debt financing. Predictions made by our theory are in line with a number of empirical results, which seem to stay in contrast to existing theories on capital structure. Our findings also carry new implications for how policies (e.g., tax policy) affect firm behavior.

Keywords: relational contracts; capital structure; corporate finance; debt financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D24 D86 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Commitment Role of Equity Financing (2019)
Working Paper: The Commitment Role of Equity Financing (2017)
Working Paper: The Commitment Role of Equity Financing (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4841

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