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Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment

Julio Elias, Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis

No 6085, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Societies prohibit many transactions considered morally repugnant, although potentially efficiency-enhancing. We conducted an online choice experiment to characterize preferences for the morality and efficiency of payments to kidney donors. Preferences were heterogeneous, ranging from deontological to strongly consequentialist; the median respondent would support payments by a public agency if they increased the annual kidney supply by six percentage points, and private transactions for a thirty percentage-point increase. Fairness concerns drive this difference. Our findings suggest that cost-benefit considerations affect the acceptance of morally controversial transactions, and imply that trial studies of the effects of payments would inform the public debate.

Keywords: repugnant transactions; efficiency; morality; markets; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D63 D64 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment (2016) Downloads
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