Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating

Martin Dufwenberg and Martin Dufwenberg
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Martin Dufwenberg

No 6208, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

Keywords: cheating; lying; costs; audience; perceived cheating aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 D82 D83 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating (2018)
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