Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics

Hans Gersbach and Verena Liessem

No 622, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.

Keywords: elections; incentive contracts; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reelection threshold contracts in politics (2008)
Working Paper: Re-election Threshold Contracts in Politics (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_622

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