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Re-election Threshold Contracts in Politics

Hans Gersbach and Verena Liessem

No 5175, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold contract stipulates the performance level that a politician must reach in order to obtain the right to stand for re-election. 'Read my lips' turns into 'read my contract'. Politicians can offer the threshold contracts during their campaign. These threshold contracts do not violate the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.

Keywords: Elections; Threshold contract; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reelection threshold contracts in politics (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics (2001) Downloads
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