The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing

Simon Gaechter, Leonie Gerhards and Daniele Nosenzo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simon Gächter

No 6497, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A burgeoning literature in economics has started examining the role of social norms in explaining economic behavior. Surprisingly, the vast majority of this literature has studied social norms in asocial decision settings, where individuals are observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show that “peers” can have a profound influence on individuals’ perceptions of norms of fair sharing, which we elicit in an incentive compatible way. However, in contrast to these strong peer effects in social norms of fair sharing, we find limited evidence of the influence of norms and peers on actual sharing behavior. We discuss how these results can be explained by heterogeneity in normative views as well as in willingness to comply with norms.

Keywords: social norms; norm compliance; peer effects; fair sharing; dictator game; framing; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C92 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing (2017)
Working Paper: The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing (2015)
Working Paper: The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing (2015)
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