EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment

Robert Dur and Ben Vollaard

No 6499, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement can be strengthened by making law enforcement activities more salient. Our focus is on illegal disposal of household garbage in residential areas. At a random subset of 56 locations in a city in the Netherlands, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting bright warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags saying that the item was “Found by law enforcement; fine minimally 90 euros”. We find evidence for a substantial reduction in illegal disposal of garbage as a result of the treatment at locations with garbage disposal containers, but not at locations with glass/paper disposal containers. Overall, the estimated treatment effect is negative, but imprecisely estimated.

Keywords: law enforcement; deterrence; perception; salience; disorder (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6499.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Salience of law enforcement: A field experiment (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6499

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6499