Economics at your fingertips  

Welfare Stigma in the Lab: Evidence of Social Signaling

Jana Friedrichsen (), Tobias König and Renke Schmacker ()

No 6519, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled and of being willing to live off others. Using a placebo treatment we can exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effect. In the experiment, social stigmatization implies a reduction in the take-up rate of 30 percentage points.

Keywords: stigma; signaling; redistribution; non take-up; welfare program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 H31 I38 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ure
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Welfare stigma in the lab: Evidence of social signaling (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().

Page updated 2019-04-24
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6519