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The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment

Florian Englmaier (), Stefan Grimm, David Schindler () and Simeon Schudy ()

No 6903, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers’ willingness to “explore” original solutions.

Keywords: team work; bonus; incentives; loss; gain; non-routine; exploration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 J33 D03 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks – Evidence from a Field Experiment (2018) Downloads
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