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The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks

Florian Englmaier, Stefan Grimm, Dominik Grothe, David Schindler and Simeon Schudy

No 6903, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams’ demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.

Keywords: team work; bonus; incentives; leadership; non-routine; exploration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 D03 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks (2023) Downloads
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