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Do Minorities Misrepresent Their Ethnicity to Avoid Discrimination?

Nikoloz Kudashvili and Philipp Lergetporer ()

No 7861, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Discrimination against minorities is pervasive in many societies, but little is known about minorities’ strategies to avoid being discriminated against. In our trust game among 758 high-school students in the country of Georgia, ethnic Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to investigate Armenians’ willingness to hide their ethnicity to avoid expected discrimination. 43 percent of Armenian trustees untruthfully signal to have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and non-pecuniary motives. This strategic misrepresentation of ethnicity increases Georgian trustors’ expected back transfers and eliminates their discriminatory behavior.

Keywords: discrimination; trust game; experiment; signaling; adolescents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 D83 J15 J16 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
Date: 2019
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