Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration

Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer and Thibaud Vergé

No 8971, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Asymmetric information in procurement entails double marginalization. The phenomenon is most severe when the buyer has all the bargaining power at the production stage, while it vanishes when the buyer and suppliers’ weights are balanced. Vertical integration eliminates double marginalization and reduces the likelihood that the buyer purchases from independent suppliers. Conditional on market foreclosure, the probability that final consumers are harmed is positive only if the buyer has more bargaining power when selecting suppliers than when negotiating over quantities and intermediate prices. The buyer’s and consumers’ interests are otherwise aligned.

Keywords: antitrust policy; vertical merger; asymmetric information; bargaining; double marginalization; procurement mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D80 L10 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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