Double marginalization and vertical integration

Choné, Philippe, Laurent Linnemer and Vergé, Thibaud
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Philippe Choné

No 15849, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be mplemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer's bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers harms final consumers.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Bargaining; Double marginalization; Optimal procurement mechanism; Vertical merger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D8 L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration (2021)
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