Ultimatum Game Behavior in a Social-Preferences Vacuum Chamber
Thomas Große Brinkhaus and
Ferdinand von Siemens
No 9280, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We study strategic interaction in an experimental social-preferences vacuum chamber. We mute social preferences by letting participants knowingly interact with computers. Our new design allows for indirect strategic interaction: there are several waves in which computer players inherit the behavior of human players from the previous wave. We apply our method to investigate trembling-hand perfection in a normal-form version of the ultimatum game. We find that behavior remains far off from a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium under selfish preferences even towards the end of our experiment. The likely reasons for our findings are strategic uncertainty and incomplete learning.
Keywords: social preferences; induced-value theory; learning; ultimatum game; strategic interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-isf
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9280
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