Gender and Cooperation in the Presence of Negative Externalities
Christina Heldman and
Holger A. Rau
No 9614, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation in such a setting, i.e., a prisoner’s dilemma game, with a passive third party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying a within-subjects setting, we compare cooperation under anonymity and social information, as personal characteristics are commonly known in real-life relations. Results show that the presence of a negative externality particularly affects guilt-averse women, who cooperate less often independently of the degree of information they receive. No gender difference is found absent negative externalities.
Keywords: cooperation; experiment; gender differences; negative externality; social information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9614
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