Gender and Cooperation in the Presence of Negative Externalities

Justus Haucap, Christina Heldman and Holger A. Rau

No 9614, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation in such a setting, i.e., a prisoner’s dilemma game, with a passive third party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying a within-subjects setting, we compare cooperation under anonymity and social information, as personal characteristics are commonly known in real-life relations. Results show that the presence of a negative externality particularly affects guilt-averse women, who cooperate less often independently of the degree of information they receive. No gender difference is found absent negative externalities.

Keywords: cooperation; experiment; gender differences; negative externality; social information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-law and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9614

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