Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization between Equally Competitive Spouses

Spencer Bastani, Lisa Dickmanns, Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler

No 9660, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze equally competitive spouses competing for promotion in their respective workplaces and show that an asymmetric equilibrium featuring household specialization can arise. Examples where the asymmetric equilibrium is welfare-superior to the symmetric equilibrium are highlighted. By investing heavily in the career of only one spouse, families reduce the intensity of the rat race of the working environment and obtain less risky consumption opportunities. Our findings suggest that specialization can reflect an efficient response to the competitiveness of the labor market and may arise even when all workers have equal opportunities to succeed in the labor market.

Keywords: contest theory; gender equality; family; household; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D13 J16 J71 M51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ore
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Related works:
Working Paper: Household specialization and competition for promotion (2024)
Working Paper: Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization Between Equally Competitive Spouses (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9660

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