Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India

Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani
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Anandi Mani: University of Warwick

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns as well as the consequences for bureaucrats’career investments. Unique micro-level data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We …nd evidence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician’s party base also helps secure important positions.

Date: 2010
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... ons/24.2010_mani.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India (2012)
Working Paper: Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:24

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