Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India

Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani ()

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Politicians face high-powered electoral pressures while bureaucrats face longer-term, low powered incentives. Given constitutional constraints, what incentives do politicians employ to control bureaucrats and how do bureaucrats respond to such incentives? These issues are addressed using a sample model where politicians use posts of varying importance to motivate bureaucrats, who respond by investing in skill or political loyalty to get important posts. Using data from the Indian Administrative Service, evidence for several key implications upon entering office are analysed. [WP no. 178].

Keywords: India; politicians; political; Indian; policy implementation; outcomes; electoral; bureaucrats; incentives; travelling; constitutional constraints; bureaucracy; data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
Note: Institutional Papers
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownl ... &AId=1781&fref=repec

Related works:
Journal Article: Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India (2012)
Working Paper: Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1781

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from eSocialSciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Padma Prakash ().