Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games

Gianluca Grimalday, Anirban Karz and Eugenio Proto
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Gianluca Grimalday: Universitat Jaume I
Anirban Karz: Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: Fairness emerges as a relevant factor in redistributive preferences in surveys and experiments. We study experimentally the impact of varying the probability with which players are assigned to initial positions in Ultimatum Games (UGs). In the baseline case players have equal opportunities of being assigned the proposer position ñ arguably the more advantaged one in UGs. Chances become increasingly unequal across three treatments. We also manipulate the inter-temporal allocation of opportunities over rounds. We Önd that: (1) The more initial chances are distributed unequally, the lower the acceptance rates of a given o§er; consequently, o§ers increase; (2) Being assigned a mere 1% chance of occupying the proposer role compared to none, significantly increases acceptance rates and decreases o§ers; (3) Players accept even extreme amounts of unequal chances within each round in exchange for overall equality of opportunities across rounds. Procedural fairness both static and dynamic - has clear relevance for individuals.

Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
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