Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games

Gianluca Grimalda, Anirban Kar and Eugenio Proto
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Anirban Kar: Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Fairness emerges as a relevant factor in redistributive preferences in surveys and experiments. We study experimentally the impact of varying the probability with which players are assigned to initial positions in Ultimatum Games (UGs). In the baseline case players have equal opportunities of being assigned the proposer position –arguably the more advantaged one in UGs. Chances become increasingly unequal across three treatments. We also manipulate the inter-temporal allocation of opportunities over rounds. We find that : (1) The more initial chances are distributed unequally, the lower the acceptance rates of a given offer ; consequently, offers increase ; (2) Being assigned a mere 1% chance of occupying the proposer role compared to none, significantly increases acceptance rates and decreases offers ; (3) Players accept even extreme amounts of unequal chances within each round in exchange for overall equality of opportunities across rounds. Procedural fairness – both static and dynamic - has clear relevance for individuals.

Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:989

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