Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games

Gianluca Grimalda, Anirban Kar () and Eugenio Proto
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Anirban Kar: Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India

No 2012/21, Working Papers from Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain)

Abstract: We investigate experimentally the modification of initial chances to acquire advantaged positions in bargaining problems. In the baseline case players have equal opportunities to acquire the advantaged position. Chances become increasingly unequal across three treatments. We find: (1) The more unequal initial chances, the lower acceptance rates of a given split; consequently inequality decreases. (2) Players react significantly to being assigned a purely symbolic 1% chance of occupying the advantaged position compared to having no chance; (3) Players respond to the way opportunities are distributed across periods of time. These results confirm and extend cross-national survey evidence concerning the relevance of procedural fairness for redistributive preferences.

Keywords: Procedural fairness; Initial opportunities; Symbolic opportunity; Ultimatum Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C99 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
Working Paper: Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games (2012)
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