Imperfect Knowledge And The Pitfalls Of Optimal Control Monetary Policy
Athanasios Orphanides () and
John Williams ()
Working Papers Central Bank of Chile from Central Bank of Chile
This paper examines the robustness characteristics of optimal control policies derived under the assumption of rational expectations to alternative models of expectations formation and uncertainty about the natural rates of interest and unemployment. We assume that agents have imperfect knowledge about the precise structure of the economy and form expectations using a forecasting model that they continuously update based on incoming data. We also allow for central bank uncertainty regarding the natural rates of interest and unemployment. We find that the optimal control policy derived under the assumption of rational expectations performs rather poorly when agents learn. These problems are exacerbated by natural rate uncertainty, even
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Chapter: Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control Monetary Policy (2009)
Working Paper: Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control Monetary Policy (2008)
Working Paper: Imperfect knowledge and the pitfalls of optimal control monetary policy (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chb:bcchwp:499
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