The Impact of Taxes and Wasteful Government Spending on Giving
Roman Sheremeta and
Neslihan Uler
Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
Abstract:
We examine the impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on charitable giving. In our model, the government collects a flat-rate tax on income net of donations and wastes part of the tax revenue before redistribution. The model provides theoretical predictions which we test in a framed field experiment. The results of the experiment show that the tax rate has a weak and insignificant effect on giving. The degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and significant effect on giving, with the relationship moderated by the curvature in the utility function.
Keywords: giving; charity donations; tax; waste; redistribution; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pke, nep-pub, nep-soc and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... -uler-taxes-2016.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on giving (2021) 
Working Paper: The Impact of Taxes and Wasteful Government Spending on Giving (2020) 
Working Paper: The Impact of Taxes and Wasteful Government Spending on Giving (2020) 
Working Paper: The Impact of Taxes and Wasteful Government Spending on Giving (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-07
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