Levine's Bibliography

From UCLA Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().

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618897000000000961: On the Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria

Robert Nau, Sabrina G Canovas and Pierre Hansen

506439000000000506: Strategic teaching and equilibrium models of repeated trust and entry games

Colin Camerer, Teck Ho, Juin-Kuan Chong and Keith Weigelt

506439000000000495: A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results

Colin Camerer, Teck Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong

506439000000000490: Behavioural studies of strategic thinking

Colin Camerer

506439000000000484: Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics

Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec

506439000000000466: Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

Ken Binmore, Larry Samuelson and Petyon Young

506439000000000461: The Evolution of Focal Points

Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson

506439000000000443: An Evolutionary View of Family Conflict and Cooperation

Ted Bergstrom

506439000000000433: An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions

Dan Ariely, Axel Ockenfels and Alvin Roth

506439000000000421: Business Cycle Accounting

V V Chari, Patrick Kehoe and Ellen McGrattan

506439000000000415: Hot Money

V. V. Chari and Patrick Kehoe

506439000000000406: A Subjective Theory of Compound Lotteries

Haluk Ergin and Faruk Gul

506439000000000394: Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: II. Applications

Marc Giannoni and Michael Woodford

506439000000000384: Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory

Marc Giannoni and Michael Woodford

506439000000000198: Smoking today or stopping tomorrow: A limited foresight perspective

Philippe Jehiel and Andrew Lilico

321307000000001011: Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study

Ariel Rubinstein

321307000000001005: Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

321307000000001000: An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

321307000000000990: Effective Labor Regulation and Microeconomic Flexibility

Ricardo Caballero, Kevin N Cowan, Eduardo Engel and Alejandro Micco

321307000000000983: Robust Monopoly Pricing

Dirk Bergemann and Karl Schlag

321307000000000978: Do School Subsidies Promote Human Capital Accumulation among the Poor?

Cesar Martinelli and Susan Parker

321307000000000965: Difficult Choices: To Agonize or not to Agonize?

Edna Ullmann-Margalit

321307000000000961: Better-Reply Strategies with Bounded Recall

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

321307000000000956: Coordinating Expectations in Monetary Policy

Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin

321307000000000950: Predicting World Cup results: Do goals seem more likely when they pay off?

Maya Bar-Hillel, David V Budescu and Moty Amar

321307000000000943: On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations

Christoph Kuzmics

321307000000000939: Hyperbolic Discounting and the Standard

Jawwad Noor

321307000000000934: Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships

David Rahman and Ichiro Obara

321307000000000926: A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games

Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff

321307000000000921: The War of Information

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

321307000000000917: Do Regional Economies Need Regional Coordination?

Edward L. Glaeser

321307000000000912: Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity

Ulrich Doraszelski and Mark Satterthwaite

321307000000000903: Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics

David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yaroslav Kryukov and Mark Satterthwaite

321307000000000898: Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks

Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell

321307000000000892: Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games

Susan Athey and Ilya Segal

321307000000000886: Political Economy of Mechanisms

Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski

321307000000000861: Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games

Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

321307000000000856: Price Stickiness in Ss Models: New Interpretations of Old Results

Ricardo Caballero and Eduardo Engel

321307000000000850: Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff

321307000000000845: Ascending Auction: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

321307000000000841: Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information

Bernard De Meyer

321307000000000836: An Economic Index of Riskiness

Robert Aumann and Roberto Serrano

321307000000000831: Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions

Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko

321307000000000821: The Political Economy of Warfare

Edward L. Glaeser

321307000000000815: Random matching in adaptive dynamics

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg and Lorens A. Imhof

321307000000000810: Contractual Frictions and Global Sourcing

Pol Antras and Elhanan Helpman

321307000000000805: Information Loss in Volatility Measurement with Flat Price Trading

Peter Phillips and Jun Yu

321307000000000793: Consistency, Heterogeneity, and Granularity of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty

Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv

321307000000000788: On Forward Induction

Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson

321307000000000781: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Random Games, and the Vertices of Random Polygons

Sergiu Hart, Yosef Rinott and Benjamin Weiss