Levine's Bibliography
From UCLA Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().
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- 784828000000000609: Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria

- Michel Benaim, Josef Hofbauer and Ed Hopkins
- 784828000000000604: Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

- Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri
- 784828000000000595: Revealed Altruism

- Jim C. Cox, Daniel Friedman and Vjollca Sadiraj
- 784828000000000565: Partially-Specified Large Games

- Ehud Kalai
- 784828000000000546: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation

- Franz Dietrich and Christian List
- 784828000000000539: Discussion of 'BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS'

- Ariel Rubinstein
- 784828000000000534: Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model

- William Jack and Roger Lagunoff
- 784828000000000518: Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation

- Narayana Kocherlakota
- 784828000000000512: Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action

- Narayana Kocherlakota and Ilhyock Shim
- 784828000000000507: Asset Pricing Implications of Pareto Optimality with Private Information

- Narayana Kocherlakota and Luigi Pistaferri
- 784828000000000502: Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control

- Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson
- 784828000000000495: Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?

- Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel
- 784828000000000490: Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms

- Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu
- 784828000000000482: Learning and Risk Aversion

- Carlos Oyarzun and Rajiv Sarin
- 784828000000000476: Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics

- Teck Ho, Noah Lim and Colin Camerer
- 784828000000000470: Why do Politicians Delegate?

- Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini
- 784828000000000465: Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?

- Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini
- 784828000000000461: Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior

- Cesar Martinelli
- 784828000000000450: Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing

- Mikhail Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski
- 784828000000000445: Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets

- Mikhail Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski
- 784828000000000439: Business Start-ups, The Lock-in Effect, and Capital Gains Taxation

- V. V. Chari, Mikhail Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski
- 784828000000000434: The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences

- Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
- 784828000000000429: A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade

- Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler
- 784828000000000408: Contracting with Third Parties

- Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom
- 784828000000000402: Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products

- Yooki Park and Suzanne Scotchmer
- 784828000000000392: Assessing the Wellbeing of the Spanish Elderly

- Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jimenez-Martin
- 784828000000000385: Three Equations Generating an Industrial Revolution?

- Michele Boldrin, Larry Jones and Aubhik Khan
- 784828000000000379: From Busts to Booms in Babies and Goodies

- Michele Boldrin, Larry Jones and Alice Schoonbroodt
- 784828000000000373: Language and the Theory of the Firm

- Jacques Cremer, Luis Garicano and Andrea Prat
- 784828000000000368: Reputation and Asset Prices: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing

- Amil Dasgupta and Andrea Prat
- 784828000000000363: Commercial Television and Voter Information

- Andrea Prat and David Strömberg
- 784828000000000357: The Price of Conformism

- Amil Dasgupta, Andrea Prat and Michela Verardo
- 784828000000000351: Folk Theorem with Communication

- Ichiro Obara
- 784828000000000346: Optimal Sin Taxes

- Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin
- 784828000000000341: A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences

- Botond Koszegi and Matthew Rabin
- 784828000000000299: The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations

- Jean-Pierre Danthine and André Kurmann
- 784828000000000295: Noise sensitivity and chaos in social choice theory

- Gil Kalai
- 784828000000000290: Developer's Expertise and the Dynamics of Financial Innovation: Theory and Evidence

- Helios Herrera and Enrique Schroth
- 784828000000000284: Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism

- Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv and Daniel Markovits
- 784828000000000278: Sequential Equilibrium in Monotone Games: Theory-Based Analysis of Experimental Data

- Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv
- 784828000000000272: An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning

- Boðaçhan Çelen, Shachar Kariv and Andrew Schotter
- 784828000000000267: Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria

- Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson
- 784828000000000261: Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games

- Rich McLean, Ichiro Obara and Andrew Postlewaite
- 784828000000000256: Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations

- Susan Athey and David Miller
- 784828000000000250: Words Speak Louder than Actions and Improve Welfare: An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning

- Boðaçhan Çelen, Shachar Kariv and Andrew Schotter
- 784828000000000238: Restructured Electricity Markets: Reevaluation of Vertical Integration and Unbundling

- Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren and Robert Wilson
- 784828000000000232: Restructured Electricity Markets: A Risk Management Approach

- Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren and Robert Wilson
- 784828000000000222: Interface between Engineering and Market Operations in Restructured Electricity Markets

- Hung-po Chao, Shmuel S Oren, Alex Papalexopoulos, Dejan J Sobajic and Robert Wilson
- 784828000000000210: Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

- William Sandholm
- 784828000000000205: The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization

- Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo