Levine's Bibliography

From UCLA Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().

Access Statistics for this working paper series.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

122247000000000560: Business Cycle Accounting

V. V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe and Ellen McGrattan

122247000000000554: Inequality and Growth in the Presence of Competition for Status

Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko

122247000000000549: Consumption, Status and Redistribution

Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko

122247000000000535: Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations

Ran Spiegler

122247000000000530: Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

122247000000000524: Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions

Susan Athey, Jonathan Levin and Enrique Seira

122247000000000518: A Critique of Structural VARs Using Real Business Cycle Theory

V. V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe and Ellen McGrattan

122247000000000514: The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited

Sushil Bikhchandani

122247000000000508: Asset Pricing Implications of Pareto Optimality with Private Information

Narayana Kocherlakota and Luigi Pistaferri

122247000000000471: Adaptive Heuristics

Sergiu Hart

122247000000000466: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

122247000000000436: Learning to Network

Brian Skyrms and Robin Pemantle

122247000000000430: Real options and the universal bad news principle

Svetlana Boyarchenko and Sergei Levendorskii

122247000000000426: On Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems in Continuous Time

Noah Williams

122247000000000422: The Correspondence Principle and Structural Stability in Non-Maximum

Gunnar Nordén

122247000000000417: Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for

Hans Peter Grüner and Elisabeth Schulte

122247000000000413: Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?

Edward Prescott

122247000000000406: Overconfidence and Informational Cascades

Shachar Kariv

122247000000000401: Clock Games: Theory and Experiments

Markus Brunnermeier and John Morgan

122247000000000395: Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division

Giuseppe Lopomo and Efe A Ok

122247000000000391: Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction

Giuseppe Lopomo

122247000000000385: Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo

122247000000000379: Merger Mechanisms

Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo and S Viswanathan

122247000000000373: Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints

Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo

122247000000000369: The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions

Giuseppe Lopomo

122247000000000356: Do Risk Premia Protect from Banking Crises

Hans Gersbach and Jan Wenzelburger

122247000000000350: Pairwise Kidney Exchange

Alvin Roth, Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver

122247000000000345: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games

Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

122247000000000340: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

George Mailath and Stephen Morris

122247000000000334: Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks

Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell

122247000000000328: The Exact Law of Large Numbers for Independent Random Matching

Darrell Duffie and Yeneng Sun

122247000000000316: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games

Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

122247000000000294: Coordination and Policy Traps

George-Marios Angeletos, Christian Hellwig and Alessandro Pavan

122247000000000289: Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities

George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan

122247000000000283: Fairness and Redistribution

Alberto Alesina and George-Marios Angeletos

122247000000000252: Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations

Philippe Jehiel and Frederic Koessler

122247000000000247: Towards a Theory of Deception

David Ettinger and Philippe Jehiel

122247000000000236: Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games

Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Georg Weizsäcker

122247000000000224: A Qualitative Approach to Markovian Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Capital

Leonard Mirman, Olivier F. Morand and Kevin L. Reffett

122247000000000218: On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Models

Philip Haile, Ali Hortacsu and Grigory Kosenok

122247000000000213: Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

Gary Charness and Matthew Jackson

122247000000000207: Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth

122247000000000203: When and How Much Does a Peg Increase Trade? The Role of Trade Costs and Import Demand Elasticity under Monetary Uncertainty

Alexander Mihailov

122247000000000199: Exploring Elements of Exchange Rate Theory in a Controlled Enivronment

Eric Fisher

122247000000000190: Diminishing Impatience and Non-Expected Utility: A Unified Framework

Yoram Halevy

122247000000000185: Diminishing Impatience: Disentangling Time Preference from Uncertain Lifetime

Yoram Halevy

122247000000000181: Testing Game Theory

Jörgen Weibull

122247000000000159: Divisible Money in an Economy with Villages

Miquel Faig

122247000000000153: Self-Correcting Information Cascades

Jacob Goeree, Thomas Palfrey and Brian Rogers

122247000000000148: Contracts, Fairness and Incentives

Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt

122247000000000143: COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR IN TWO-PERSON GUESSING GAMES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

Miguel Costa-Gomes and Vincent Crawford

122247000000000138: Efficient Allocations, with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending

Abraham Arpad and Nicola Pavoni

122247000000000132: Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence

Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck and Jörg Oechssler

122247000000000127: Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Masaki Aoyagi and Guillaume R. Frechette

122247000000000113: Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study

Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Vincent Crawford

122247000000000108: Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction

John Duffy and Jack Ochs

122247000000000104: Non-robustness of the Cash-in-advance Equilibrium in the Trading Post Model

R. Vijay Krishna

122247000000000097: The Rise of Cooperation in Correlated Matching Prisoners Dilemma: An Experiment

Chun Lei Yang and Ching Syang Jack Yue

122247000000000092: Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction - The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia

Ernst Fehr and Jean-Robert Tyran

122247000000000086: Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

Martin Cripps, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson

122247000000000082: Rent dissipation in repeated entry games: some new results

Jean-Pierre Ponssard

122247000000000078: Existence of Equilibrium for Segmented Markets Models with Interest Rate Monetary Policies

Filippo Occhino

122247000000000073: 24

Jordi Brandts and Klaus Abbink

122247000000000055: Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

Michihiro Kandori and Ichiro Obara

122247000000000050: On the Recursive Saddle Point Method

Matthias Messner and Nicola Pavoni

122247000000000044: Learning in Networks: An Experimental Study

Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv

122247000000000035: Finite Mixture Analysis of Beauty-Contest Data from Multiple Samples

Antoni Bosch-Domenech, Jose G. Montalvo, Rosemarie Nagel and Albert Satorra

122247000000000028: Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

V. Bhaskar, George Mailath and Stephen Morris

122247000000000023: The Market: Catalyst for Rationality and Filter of Irrationality

John List and Daniel Millimet

122247000000000018: Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth

122247000000000006: Behavioral Identification in Coalition Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers

G Frechette, John Kagel and Massimo Morelli

122247000000000001: Promises and Partnership

Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg

7610: Choice Under Uncertainty

Goncalo L Fonseca and Leanne J Ussher

513: Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality

Robert Aumann