Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games

Colin Camerer (), Marc Knez and Roberto Weber

No 970, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Date: 1996-05
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Journal Article: Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games (2004)
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