Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India
Mario Macis () and
Pradeep Chintagunta ()
Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia
We use a field experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment clinics in India to test whether peer referrals increase screening and identification of patients with an infectious disease. Low-cost financial incentives considerably raise the probability that current patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in the cost-effective identification of new tuberculosis cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms - peers have private information about individuals in their social networks (beyond their immediate families) to target for outreach, and peers are more effective than traditional contact tracing by paid health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested.
Keywords: tuberculosis; referrals; social networks; case finding; incentives; India; health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201911
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